Biotechnologies are generally developed to heal people from severe diseases. However, many of these technologies have the potential to be used beyond the frame of therapy as a way to improve or enhance normal human capacities. Biotechnologies can help to make people think better, to improve their memory and perception, to feel happier or to improve physical skills in sports, music or dance, or to extend the normal human lifespan. In view of the potential of biotechnologies (and other technologies like nanotechnologies and information technologies) to change our capacities, there is an ethical debate whether such an enhancement may alter our sense of self, our human nature and our relation with other life forms. Moreover, there is a concern about the impact of these technologies on our society and the position of vulnerable groups. More fundamentally there is concern over whether enhancement is a good thing in itself and whether it may expose our human nature, our personal life and our society to irreversible damage.
The moral ambiguity of enhancement
Although enhancement basically means improvement or adding of a new capacity, its application in the area of human cognitive and physical capacities seems to evoke negative sentiments to many. Enhancement is an ambiguous concept which can mean better and more, but also something that many people may think to be less desirable and that should be avoided. For example, genetic doping in sports may be highly valued by some athletes, but may be judged negatively by many others because it may result in unfair competition. Indeed, there is some concern that the use of cognitive and physical enhancers reinforces individualist values, such as competitiveness and cheating behaviour. There is also a concern
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The negative evaluation of enhancement is partly the result of the history of eugenics in the early decades of the 20th century. Many handicapped persons and people with psychiatric and psychogeriatric disorders were sterilised and killed because they did not meet the Nazis' ideals of race and humanity. People with physical and learning disabilities have the feeling that the application of enhancement technologies as a new kind of eugenics might result in a less favourable view of those with handicaps and disabilities, and even of their existence as members of society. One can argue that some kinds of enhancement can indeed be considered as eugenic. An example may be the genetic improvement and genetic selection through prenatal and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD and PIGD). However, the proponents of these new technologies argue that there is a big difference with the approach of the 'old' eugenics because of the emphasis in the 'new' eugenics on free choice and autonomy ('liberal eugenics', Agar, 2004) . Nonetheless, the basic idea is the same, namely the weeding out of undesirable physical and psychological traits. One should be aware that a broad application of enhancement can indeed lead to discrimination of handicapped persons.
But is enhancement always bad or at least dubious and thus unacceptable? To reach a better understanding of the moral value of enhancement, its goals are often compared with those of therapy. While therapeutic interventions are usually the source for the development of enhancement technologies, our moral evaluation of each differs markedly. Where therapy is generally seen as something good, perhaps for its relief of suffering, enhancement is sometimes considered bad, or at least ambiguous. In this debate an abstract conceptual scale is often invoked with, at one end, examples of enhancement and, at the other end, the normal applications of medical technology. However, there is no consensus about what should be seen as a 'normal' application of medical technology and this is one of the major difficulties with the rejection of human enhancement. A normal application is defined as a treatment that falls within the goals of medicine, like the treatment of disease and the alleviation of suffering. Yet establishing robust distinctions is not so easy. Take, for example, the following case, outlined by Norman Daniels in a classic essay:
Johnny is a short eleven year old boy with documented growthhormone deficiency resulting from a brain tumour. His parents are of
